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Abstract 
This CEPS Policy Brief is based on a larger study for the EEAS and European Commission, written by the 
same authors in the run-up of the Milan ASEM summit of 16-17 October 2014. The main idea of the study 
is to assess whether ASEM works and how, by verifying the factual evidence in detail. After all, ASEM has 
no institutions, no budget and no treaty, whilst dialogues and a loose improvement over time in Asia-Europe 
relations refer to process much more than genuine ‘results’. The stocktaking covers all ASEM activities since 
the 2006 Helsinki summit. Summit and foreign ministers’ declarations and ASEM calendar of activities 
(and interviews) are used to trace ASEM activities in the three ASEM pillars (political, economic, and 
peoples-to-peoples/cultural). All the ‘regular’ ASEM meetings at ministerial and other levels (many of which 
are only known to relatively few) have been mapped. Also the ASEM working methods, based on the 2000 
AECF framework and many subsequent initiatives, have been scrutinised, including whether they are 
actually implemented or not or partially. Such methods refer to how to work together in areas of cooperation 
(beyond the typical ASEM dialogue), organisation, coordination and ASEM visibility.  
The main conclusion is that ASEM works reasonably well, once one accepts the ASEM of today, although 
some inefficiencies still characterise the ‘system’. There is a host of secondary conclusions on the three pillars, 
the foreign ministers, the strong government-to-government nature of ASEM and the working methods. We 
recommend that today’s ASEM needs no reform and that not having ASEM would entail political and 
diplomatic costs. We emphasise that ASEM is well placed to stimulate exchange of information between the 
mega-FTAs such as TPP, RCEP and TTIP. However, the ASEM of tomorrow might be different, given the 
great changes in geo-political and economic conditions since ASEM began in the mid-1990s. Moreover, the 
size of ASEM has become such that classical ways of operating with (after Milano) 53 countries (including 
the EU and ASEAN) cannot possibly be effective all the time. We suggest that, in the run-up to the 20th 
ASEM birthday (2016), EU and Asian independent think-tanks get together to write an ‘options report’ 
reconsidering options for a new ASEM, as the basis for a profound and wide debate how to get more value-
added out of ASEM.  
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Key points 
 The ASEM summit of 16-17 October in Milan – with 50-plus prime ministers and other government 
leaders from Asia and Europe – underlines once again that ASEM countries regard a regular and 
wide-ranging dialogue between Asia (writ large) and Europe as being of value in itself.  
 Better understanding and direct contact between government leaders, combined with the 
numerous other ASEM activities which attract much less attention, has resulted in far better and 
more intense relations between Asian and European governments (and of course the EU) than 
when ASEM began, 18 years ago. This is an invaluable ‘result’. 
 ASEM is ultra-light, has not institutionalised, has no funding and is not based on ‘hard’ 
commitments. We show that ASEM works, even if it leaves something to be desired. If one would 
want ‘results’ beyond dialogue and mutual understanding, one would need to talk about another 
ASEM. Whether there is much support with the 50-plus ASEM governments (and the EU) for 
deepening ASEM and moving to active cooperation, with some commitments, programmes and a 
minimum degree of institutionalisation, is anything but clear.  
 We see sound reasons to re-consider the set-up and working of ASEM in the run-up to ASEM’s 20th 
birthday in 2016, without losing out on what ASEM means today. Independent think tanks in Asia 
and Europe could prepare an ‘options report’ as the first step for an ASEM-wide debate to assess 
whether deepening and other reforms add value for the 50 ASEM countries. 
1. Introduction and purpose 
On 16-17 October 2014, the 10th ASEM (Asia-
Europe Meeting) Summit will be held in Milan 
under Italy’s chairmanship and hosted by the EU. 
No less than 49 prime ministers or presidents (and 
the sultan of Brunei), the Secretary General of 
ASEAN and the presidents of the European 
Council and of the European Commission will 
gather at the summit in order to cement and 
improve Asia-Europe relations.1 ASEM has existed 
for 18 years. Although it attracts many political 
leaders and is firmly established, it is poorly known 
in policy circles and the wider public. It was 
created in reaction to the frictions between Europe 
and a part of Asia that originated at the June 1993 
United Nations World Conference on Human 
Rights in Vienna and continued into 1994. But the 
ASEM initiative (first proposed by Singapore Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong) was also motivated as a 
positive answer to the EU’s New Asia Strategy of 
1994, a policy U-turn that recognised the huge 
economic and political importance of a rising Asia, 
especially East Asia. 2  In the conventional sense, 
                                                   
1 Note that Asia in this paper is ‘writ large’, as ASEM 
now includes Australia, New Zealand and Russia. New 
ASEM members (expected at the Milan summit) will be 
Kazakhstan and Croatia. Turkey is interested. 
2 For a detailed account of the emergence and beginning 
of ASEM, see V. Pou Serradel (1996) and Pelkmans & 
Shinkai (1997). In the latter, a host of initial documents of 
the first summit in Bangkok and the first year of follow-
ups are included. See also Reiterer (2002).  
ASEM has neither institutions nor a budget. The 
original idea was that it would be summit-driven 
(meeting every two years) and that the summiteers 
would call for ‘follow-ups’ in the Summit Chair 
Statement. Any institutionalisation was to be 
avoided. What mattered was a regular dialogue so 
as to deepen understanding between decision-
makers in Asia and Europe, stimulate ‘people-to-
people’ contacts, generate more trust, and exchange 
information, views and ideas for policies of 
common concern.  
The present CEPS Policy Brief serves a precise but 
modest purpose. It inspects, on the basis of 
extensive data collection, ‘whether and how ASEM 
works’ and what exactly it has done so far. It is 
hoped that this exercise may help readers to better 
appreciate the role and substance of ASEM in the 
run-up to the Milan Summit. Our analysis is also of 
interest because misunderstandings and indeed 
misgivings about ASEM linger, often without much 
factual basis and without much of an appreciation 
of what ASEM is and is not. Since it has no 
institutions, data are not easy to collect and, more 
often than not, incomplete. We shall summarise3 
ASEM activities at all levels since the 2006 Helsinki 
Summit and briefly assess ASEM working 
methods. The conclusions and recommendations 
show how ASEM can improve its functioning. 
                                                   
3 A more detailed account of all ASEM activities, as well 
as 12 appendices reflecting the data collection, can be 
found in the full study on which this Policy Brief is based 
(Pelkmans & Hu, 2014). 
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Table 1. ASEM topics presented at all four ASEM summits (2006-2012) 
no Political (pillar 1) Economic (pillar 2) Cultural/peoples (pillar 3) 
1 Afghanistan   
2   ASEF 
3 ASEM coop./future ASEM coop./future ASEM coop./future 
4  Climate change  
5 Counterterrorism   
6   Cultures/civilisations 
7  Disaster relief/management  
8  Econ ministers meeting  
9   Education 
10  Energy  
11   Interfaith dialogue 
12 Iran   
13 Korean peninsula   
14  Labour & employment  
15  Sustainable development  
16 UN reform   
17  WTO   
 
2. Stocktaking: Issues at ASEM 
summits 
At the four ASEM summits in Helsinki, Beijing, 
Brussels and Vientiane (and spanning from 2006 
to 2012), a total of 63 topics were addressed. 
Some of them were so closely related that they 
can be combined, resulting in 52 topics.4 
Of these 52 topics, 17 were incorporated in the 
Summit Chair Statements of all four ASEM 
summits. They are listed in Table 1 above 
according to the ASEM pillar5  to which they 
belong.  
Another six topics were presented three times at 
the summits: human rights, Myanmar and 
transnational crime/drugs in the political pillar, 
and food security, health security and science 
and technology in the economic pillar. The other 
29 topics were presented only once or twice. 
Studying this data allows some tentative 
conclusions concerning ASEM summits: 
                                                   
4 For technical details, see Pelkmans & Hu, 2014. 
5  There are three ASEM pillars: political dialogue, 
economic cooperation and cultural/people-to-people 
exchange. 
i. ASEM deals with many topics. This is in 
accordance with its tradition and with the 
2006 Helsinki Declaration on ASEM’s future, 
which stated that ASEM sees its mission as 
very broad and that is has a “vital role as a 
framework for dialogue and cooperation, 
serving as a prime point of convergence 
between Europe and Asia”. Under the 
heading “Defining broad perspectives”, the 
declaration lists a host of policy areas and 
emphasises that ASEM “will address such 
policy areas while remaining faithful to its 
character of informality, networking and 
flexibility” while also offering opportunities 
for an informal dialogue on “topical priority 
issues…following but also shaping the 
international policy agenda”. These avowed 
characteristics set it far apart from the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), for 
example, which is focused on economic 
cooperation (ASEM’s second pillar). 
Moreover, although APEC is also based on 
voluntarism (and no treaty underlies its 
work), its history records plenty of concrete 
commitments and calendar-based ‘action 
plans’ on trade liberalisation, e.g. the “Bogor 
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Goals of 1994 to achieve free and open trade 
and investment by 2010 for industrialised 
economies and by 2020 for developing 
economies and a voluntary “Mutual 
Recognition Arrangement” in 
telecommunications signed by all 21 APEC 
countries.6 
ii. According to the data, pillars 1 and 2 appear 
to be of greater importance to ASEM than 
pillar 3, but reality does not support that 
conclusion. ASEM’s main mission is 
embodied in its summits and foreign 
minister meetings (FMMs), but outside these 
contexts the Asia-Europe Foundation 
(ASEF), founded by ASEM member 
countries, is entirely devoted to the third 
pillar in a ‘hands-on’ fashion via numerous 
programmes. Indeed, summitry is inherently 
unsuitable to promote people-to-people 
interchange, cultural encounters and 
discourse in the civil society. One needs a 
special institution to bring those to life and 
build on experience, networking and a 
stream of innovative ideas.  
3. Stocktaking: ‘follow-ups’ of ASEM 
summits and ASEM ‘regular’ 
meetings 
3.1 Summits and regular meetings 
There is an impression in some ASEM circles 
and the world press that its summits are 
basically ‘stand-alone’ events and that the Chair 
Statement – often full of announcements of 
ASEM activities – is not followed up very well. 
If this is ever the case, ASEM may develop a 
credibility problem. A ‘follow-up’ is defined, for 
present purposes, as an ASEM activity (or 
several activities) recognised in the ASEM 
calendar and specifically referred to in the Chair 
Statement. This is denoted as a ‘direct follow-
up’. There are also other ASEM activities not 
mentioned in the Chair Statement; we shall 
survey those, too. Finally, there are many ASEF 
                                                   
6 APEC shows some resemblance to ASEM, hence the 
comparison. It is also of importance that 11 ASEM 
countries are also members of APEC. 
activities; those not organised under ASEM’s 
mandate7 are not counted here.  
Table 2 gives a concise survey of direct follow-
ups of four ASEM summits, starting with 
Helsinki. Over the seven years following the 
Helsinki Summit, many direct follow-ups can be 
observed (in total, no less than 170). In some 
years there are on average two ASEM activities 
every month, in other years fewer but still an 
average of almost two per month. Therefore, it 
simply cannot be argued that there are few 
follow-ups. ASEM activity in between summits 
is lively and varied. It is also incorrect to assert 
that although there are many ASEM activities, 
there is nevertheless a lack of follow-up because 
a number of announced activities or those 
referred to in the Chair Statements are often 
conveniently forgotten.  
Table 2. Direct follow-ups of four ASEM summits: 
2006-2013 
(following) Pillar 1 
(Political) 
Pillar 2 
(Economic) 
Pillar 3 
(Cultural/ 
peoples) 
Helsinki 3 31 12 
Beijing 6 29 15 
Brussels 4 20 16 
Vientiane 3 20 11 
 
Besides ASEM activities directly linked to the 
Chair Statements, other ASEM activities, not 
literally flowing from what is noted in the Chair 
Statement, have also been organised: most of 
these (22) have taken place in pillar 2, another 11 
in pillar 3 and 3 in pillar 1.  
When assessing the follow-ups of summits, one 
has to first realise what the limits are of this 
empirical approach. First, a number of ASEM 
summit topics may give rise to follow-ups in the 
diplomatic domain and/or international 
organisations. These follow-ups are invisible to 
outsiders. Interviews have indicated that no 
systematic ASEM follow-ups are practised as a 
                                                   
7 ASEF is the Asia-Europe Foundation, created in 1997 
and located in Singapore. Its mission is cultural and 
includes people-to-people activities. See www.asef.org. 
Note that ASEF helps organise several ASEM 
ministerial meetings such as those on education and 
workshops like the regular informal ASEM seminar on 
human rights.  
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rule, but ASEM countries may of course refer to 
ASEM summit conclusions or positions. Second, 
dependent on the summit, the Chair Statement 
can be more or less comprehensive as to ASEM 
activities. It is certainly not automatically the 
case that one can safely rely on the Chair 
Statement in order to know what ASEM does or 
is planning to do. In Helsinki, for example, the 
Chair opted for a relatively short statement that 
does not cover all activities. Thus, after Helsinki 
and after Beijing, many ASEM activities are not 
‘direct follow-ups’ from the Chair Statement. 
With longer statements and better preparation 
of drafts, the Chair is better able to refer to 
nearly all initiatives of ASEM. 
Third, ASEM has developed a (growing) 
number of ‘regular’ activities (which we will call 
‘regulars’) and ministerial activities 
(‘ministerials’) that are sometimes explicitly 
recognised in the statement but not on other 
occasions, and which have grown into stable 
sectorial or otherwise specialised meetings. 
Table 3 lists these 30 regulars, 7 regular 
ministerials and 23 other regular encounters of 
various types.8 The regulars may or may not be 
mentioned in the Chair Statement, but it is less 
and less the case that one could regard these 
meetings as a direct ‘follow-up’ of a summit. On 
the contrary, these meetings develop a routine 
that may well include strong messages ‘upward’ 
to the summiteers which ‘follow-up’ these 
ministerials as it were, and give it greater 
political exposure and leverage. 
Fourth, the activities calendar of ASEF should 
not be ignored, as it is getting closer, in some of 
its work, to the main activities of ASEM.  
Altogether, although ASEM is summit-driven, 
this does not at all mean that little occurs 
between summits. On the contrary, in the 
aftermath of the summits, many ASEM activities 
have been undertaken in many policy domains 
and at several levels, be they direct follow-ups 
or other activities.  
With 100 activities, pillar 2 dominates ASEM 
activities, pillar 3 having 54 and pillar 1 only 16. 
This distribution may well reflect the more 
                                                   
8 Note that ASEM Summits, Foreign Minister Meetings 
(FMMs) and Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs) under the 
FMM are not included in these 30 regulars.  
diplomatic nature of many Pillar 1 exchanges 
that, at least inside ASEM as such, do not lend 
themselves to direct follow-ups so easily.  
Table 3. Regular ASEM ministerials and other 
encounters 
Nr ASEM policy domain or subject 
 ASEM ministerial meetings 
1. ASEM finance ministers 
2. ASEM environment ministers 
3. ASEM culture ministers 
4. ASEM labour/employment ministers 
5. ASEM economic ministers 
6. ASEM transport ministers 
7. ASEM education ministers 
 Other ASEM regular meetings 
 Informal Human 
Rights Seminar 
ASEM Young Political 
Leaders Conference 
 ASEM Customs 
Enforcement/Procedu
res WG 
Seminar on Nuclear 
Safety 
 ASEM 
Counterterrorism 
Conference 
ASEM Sustainable 
Development Seminar 
on Water Management 
 ASEM Symposium on 
Urban Forestry 
ASEM Rectors 
Conference 
 ASEM Interfaith 
Dialogue 
ASEM Meeting of 
Governors and Mayors 
 ASEM conference on 
e-commerce 
ASEM Seminar on 
quality Assurance in 
Higher Education 
 ASEM DGs 
Conference on 
Migratory Flows 
Management between 
Asia and Europe 
ASEM 
Business/Universities 
Forum 
 ASEM Workshop on 
HIV/AIDS 
ASEM Vocational 
Education Symposium 
 ASEM Youth 
Interfaith Dialogue 
Asia-Europe Business 
Forum 
 Customs DGs & 
Commissioners 
Meeting 
ASEM ASEP 
(Parliamentary 
Partnership) 
 Asia-Europe 
Environmental Forum 
Asia-Europe Peoples 
Forum 
 Asia-Europe 
Economic Forum 
 
Note: Not all regular activities under TPAP (Trade 
Promotion Action Plan) and IPAP (Investment Promotion 
Action Plan) are included above, as some of these activities 
are not recorded in the sources; nor do they issue press 
releases. The original IPAP can be found in Pelkmans & 
Shinkai (1997, Appendix IV). 
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ASEM has become an active community for 
governments and, occasionally, for non-
government participants. For several 
ministerials, the absence of any ASEM 
organisation or secretariat is compensated by 
ASEF, which provides, on request, support 
services that facilitate continuity and probably 
strengthen a kind of ‘memory’ for these 
ministerials.   
Table 3 shows that ASEM inter-summit 
activities begin to be more ‘regular’ in many 
areas. These regular meetings give more 
structure to ASEM, without any form of 
institutionalisation or loss of flexibility. They 
reduce the unpredictability of an ASEM-
summit-led tradition of encounters and 
initiatives. They express, at least through their 
established frequency, the ASEM common 
interest. They help participants explore better 
policies or best practices whilst contributing to a 
better mutual understanding of one another’s 
policies and positioning. The regularity should 
also help build trust between ministers and 
officials from Asia and Europe. Thus ASEM is 
summit-driven, without any doubt, and this 
provides prominence, press attention and 
political leadership. But by 2014 ASEM has 
grown in other ways and in many policy 
domains not necessarily dependent on its 
summits but on perceived or explicitly 
expressed mutual interest in specific areas.  
3.2 ASEM foreign ministers: commonality, 
except for trade cooperation? 
The most general, consistent and regular 
‘follow-up’ of summits is pursued between them 
by the bi-annual Foreign Ministers Meeting 
(FMM). The degree of similarity and overlap in 
topics and announcements or instructions for 
follow-ups between post-summit FMM Chair 
Statements and the Chair Statements of 
preceding ASEM summits is great. Indeed, 
FMMs tend to position themselves as the 
‘guardian’ of ASEM in the period between 
summits, resulting in reiteration of ASEM 
summit positions, reminders about follow-ups 
and a purely formal updates of specific action 
agendas. Only in the broad area of foreign 
policy and security – the domain par excellence 
of the FMMs – does it appear that FMMs assume 
a somewhat greater discretion in positioning 
ASEM as a group. However, precisely in this 
area, follow-ups – if any – are next to impossible 
to verify on the basis of public documents. There 
is ample literature on the foreign policy 
positioning and some other issues in ASEM 
summits and FMMs; therefore, and given the 
purpose of this brief, we shall not elaborate on 
them. 9  FMM Chair Statements tend to be 
prudent and highly diplomatic. The whole point 
of ASEM’s founding was to avoid confrontation 
and always seek what binds ASEM partners. 
This is still the case today. Confrontation is 
sidestepped by respectfully exchanging views 
and pronouncing common perspectives. 
However, there is one interesting exception, in 
the FMMs and recent summits, to this unspoken 
but firm ASEM philosophy: the almost explicit 
difference of opinion between a large part of 
Asia and the EU on further trade cooperation, 
led by the Economic Ministers Meeting (EMM). 
The word ‘further’ is critical because, as noted, 
there are several regular ASEM meetings at 
Director General or technical level on customs, 
investment promotion or standards. Very little 
is publicly known about these encounters, let 
alone what they yield and how they help 
improve trade policy-making. As far as the 
authors know, they are pure technical or, 
sometimes, capacity building exchanges, not 
cooperation in the more operational sense of 
trying to align standards or promote joint 
initiatives in ASEM or in the WTO. The last 
EMM was held in Rotterdam in 2005. Several 
ASEM summits and the FMMs in Hamburg 
(2007), Ha Noi (2009) and Godollo (Hungary, 
2011) called for a new meeting of the EMM. The 
Hamburg Chair Statement even “underlined the 
potential of ASEM-economic dialogue and 
cooperation to be a showcase for concrete ASEM 
achievements”. In Hamburg and in Ha Noi, host 
countries (Indonesia and India) were 
mentioned, but the EMMs were never held.10 
                                                   
9  See Pelkmans & Hu, 2014, section 3.2 for a short 
survey of the four FMMs since Helsinki. 
10 How difficult it seemed to have been is also clear from 
the Chair Statement of Godollo, following a report from 
an informal SOMTI (SOM for trade and investment). 
The FMM “encouraged ASEM members to reconvene 
the ASEM EMM at an early date” and for a formal 
SOMTI to be organised in early 2012, but it was never 
held.  
DOES ASEM WORK? | 7 
 
The open friction at several summits and FMMs 
concerning the ASEM Economic Ministers 
Meetings seems paradoxical. It is not in the 
spirit of ASEM; indeed, it seems to be the only 
instance of such a split, repeatedly appearing in 
prominent ASEM statements, without much 
avail. The authors have attempted to arrive at a 
possible explanation of this ‘stalemate’. It is clear 
from interviews that most of Asia is in favour of 
further trade cooperation and of EMMs to lead 
the effort, whereas the EU seems to be reluctant. 
We suggest that there is a link between this 
impasse and the ongoing trade negotiations 
between the EU and many East Asian countries 
as well as India and (an investment treaty with) 
China. There is a ‘tactical’ and a ‘structural’ 
aspect to this link. Concerning the tactical, the 
EU might hesitate to expose economic ministers 
(of trade and industry) to the pressures of 
several Asian partners that might affect these 
(bilateral) negotiations. These negotiations are 
also tied to strategies of East Asian and Pacific 
regionalism, whether those of the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP, 
led by the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, ASEAN) or of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP). One might of course assume 
different views on such a position, even more so 
now that the EU has begun its Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
negotiations with the US, which are likely to 
affect the TPP negotiations, in which the US 
plays an important role. It is not inconceivable 
that ASEM might eventually play a useful role 
in these strategic trade questions, but this would 
require a different attitude especially on the part 
of the EU. 
Concerning the structural aspect of the link, the 
point is that within ASEM the EU – though it of 
course formally speaks with a single voice – in 
fact wears two faces: the face of political 
diplomacy (via the European External Action 
Service, or EEAS, and individual member states’ 
own diplomatic efforts), characterised by soft 
power and a natural inclination to align 
comfortably with East Asian traditions of 
searching for what binds – but does not 
constrain – ASEM members; and the face 
expressed by the ‘hard’ power of market access 
rules and discipline concluded in trade and 
investment negotiations (via the Commission, 
with DG Trade in the lead but closely involving 
member states and the new European 
Parliament’s trade powers). These ‘two EUs’ can 
enjoy a ‘peaceful coexistence’, but there is a 
profound reluctance to blend them. This is 
especially so because ASEM is not even an 
organisation and is allergic to committing itself 
to the slightest form of institutionalisation (such 
as a purely functional secretariat). Furthermore, 
it is suspected that such a step would lead to 
such a low common denominator in trade 
cooperation (probably also with opt-outs, and 
certainly no treaties) that the perceived costs are 
higher than the imaginable benefits in terms of 
lower market access barriers. This explanation is 
consistent with the continuation of highly 
technical cooperation in, e.g. customs practices, 
whilst holding off ASEM-based trade talks at 
EMM level.  
4. ASEM working methods: 
efficiency and effectiveness 
ASEM’s working methods matter primarily for 
officials engaged in the many ASEM processes 
and encounters. For outside observers, citizens 
and stakeholders, they matter only insofar as 
they tell us something about the efficiency and 
effectiveness of ASEM. However, this is in itself 
already puzzling: how can ASEM, which is not 
an organisation or institution, be efficient 
and/or effective? Its deliverables are far more a 
question of process than concrete measures, and 
its ultimate purpose is to maintain or improve 
general Europe-Asia relations. This problem 
was recognised early on in ASEM and led to 
“AECF 2000”: the Asia-Europe Cooperation 
Framework for working methods at the 2000 
Seoul ASEM Summit. The idea is the following: 
since ASEM is an open and evolutionary 
process, its working methods help to translate 
ASEM leaders’ political decisions into tangible 
policy, either as political directions or as 
administrative measures.  
The present CEPS Policy Brief is not the place to 
analyse in depth the ASEM working methods.11 
We shall limit the discussion to the more 
important aspects without too much 
bureaucratic detail. The ASEM working 
                                                   
11 Our study, op. cit., in chapter 4, comprises a detailed 
discussion of all the issues and mechanisms of 
implementation and organisation of ASEM.  
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methods touch upon four policy aspects, namely 
how to work together in areas of cooperation 
(including ‘issue-based leadership’ 12 ), 
organisation, coordination (including 
administration and events coordination) and 
visibility. The overall conclusion is that, while 
ASEM administration and visibility proved very 
difficult tasks to accomplish, partners have 
improved ASEM working methods in the areas 
of cooperation, organisation and events 
coordination. 13  The mechanism of ‘issue-based 
leadership’, potentially important for 
developing and small ASEM countries, was not 
duly implemented by partners.   
ASEM’s sheer size and informal nature strongly 
suggest that its day-to-day administration, in the 
absence of an institutional structure, is 
challenging. Three coordination initiatives have 
been endorsed by ASEM partners since the 
Helsinki Summit, to enhance ASEM day-to-day 
information and administrative support: ASEM 
Virtual Secretariat (AVS), Technical Support to 
the Coordination of ASEM Process (TASC) and 
the ASEM Chairman’s Support Group (ACSG). 
These three initiatives have not been successful, 
although TASC had distinct merits.14 All three 
are attempts to make up for the steadfast refusal 
of ASEM governments to establish an ASEM 
                                                   
12 Issue-based leadership might have been a good idea, 
as an attempt to cluster themes and have groups of 
ASEM countries most interested in the themes work 
together. A kind of ‘variable geometry’, ASEM style. 
One additional advantage would have been that small 
and less developed ASEM countries could have been 
more closely involved in the selection of agenda’s 
according to their preferences, something that in the 
huge ASEM is otherwise difficult to accomplish. Indeed, 
the ‘leadership’ of some issues would be laid in the 
hands of these small or developing countries, so as to 
help stimulate policy thinking in the countries. See also 
note 20.  
13  “Improved” does not mean that the agreed ASEM 
‘coordination’ always works. For example, a modest 
form of ASEM ‘branding’ is the use of the agreed ASEM 
logo for all announcements and activities. However, a 
recent summit was held under a logo specially designed 
by the host country, thereby reducing recognition. 
14 Endorsed by the Hanoi FMM in 2009, TASC (January 
2010-March 2012) was deliverables-based. It had a strict 
obligation to transparency, accessibility and 
accountability to all ASEM partners while providing 
technical support, mainly through the ASEM Intranet 
that the TASC team set up. 
secretariat, no matter how modest and purely 
technical and/or logistical. APEC has a 
secretariat, and although it has grown in staff 
over time, it has never been endowed with any 
real powers whilst effectively serving the 21 
APEC countries and APEC’s working parties 
and committees. But ASEM’s early conviction 
not to turn into an ‘institution’ is apparently still 
quite strong, though it is not shared by all 
countries. Having recognised the coordination 
deficiencies, ASEM partners’ preferences about 
setting up an ASEM secretariat have invariably 
remained quite disparate. Some advocate 
upgrading ASEF to become the ASEM 
secretariat; some argue, on the premise of the 
AECF 2000, to maintain the status quo of ASEM 
coordination, i.e. without a secretariat; some 
suggest establishing two secretariats, one in Asia 
and one in Europe to promote ASEM in tandem. 
One interviewee pointed out that in promoting 
ASEM, ASEF has become well known in Asia, 
but not in Europe. Therefore, ASEF could 
become ASEM’s secretariat in Asia; in the 
meantime, a European ASEM secretariat, 
perhaps in Brussels, could also be established. It 
would re-enforce Europe’s identity in the ASEM 
process, and might serve as a good counterpart 
to ASEF in Asia. 
The present authors appreciate the general 
sentiment in the ASEM community that, when 
discussing ASEM working methods, too much 
time has been consumed or perhaps wasted on 
the question of a secretariat. This may well be 
correct, because establishing a secretariat will 
not automatically, or ‘magically’, solve all 
practical issues, and could become entangled in 
typical intergovernmental haggling before it 
could even start working.15 But there is more: 
focussing too much on one single ‘solution’ – a 
secretariat – might lead one to ignore other ways 
to address the problems of (more) effective 
coordination and ASEM ‘memory’. One such 
alternative is to organise a well-prepared and 
                                                   
15  The latter fear consists of endless debates on its 
location, the number of staff members and from what 
countries, its remit and budget, and who would pay for 
it. Just giving one example of how cautious ASEM 
countries are, the ASEM Infoboard (managed by ASEF), 
which is no more than an ASEM information portal at 
very low cost, is paid for by voluntary contributions of 
ASEM countries. 
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timely ‘handover’ of the ASEM dossier and 
knowledge base to other officials inside national 
administrations, 16  thereby ensuring continuity 
and stability by passing on the ASEM ‘memory’ 
and spirit. Complementary to an efficient 
handover is that host countries prepare 
themselves well and verify up-to-date 
networking and recent initiatives of all kinds. To 
some extent, this has been accomplished 
between summits by the (old) host-to- (new) 
host cooperation.  
With regard to raising visibility, it is crucial to 
realise that ASEM is very much a process driven 
by governments, for governments and of 
governments, including their policy-making 
officials. It neither serves nor involves citizens, 
except sometimes in the margin. On this account 
alone, it is bound to be very difficult for ASEM 
to reach billions of ordinary people from Asia 
and Europe. This was confirmed by two press-
monitoring exercises 17  in 2010 and 2011, 
respectively. Media outlets have little to report 
on ASEM in the absence of summits and FMMs, 
while specialised ASEM activities – which, 
again, are only for government officials or 
ministers, and only sometimes for technical 
experts and analysts – are scattered across all 
ASEM countries throughout the year. Of course, 
almost right from the start, ASEF was and 
continues to be called upon to serve as a conduit 
to connect citizens and civil society with the 
ASEM process. Having a permanent staff, 
various communication tools, such as its 
comprehensive website, and rich programmes, 
ASEF – true to its mandate – has achieved good 
visibility within ASEM civil society.   
However, in recent years ASEF has advocated 
moving ‘upstream’ in the ASEM process, i.e. to 
become an ‘ASEM Secretariat’, while on its 
website it already profiles itself as ASEM’s “only 
permanently established institution”. 18 
Although factually correct (except for the 
secretariat for the ASEM educational ministers 
in Bonn), this claim nevertheless seems to 
contradict Point III.8 of the AECF 2000, which 
                                                   
16 Changes of national ASEM officers are frequent, and 
can be problematic, absent any joint ASEM body. 
17 See Pelkmans & Hu (2014) for details. 
18 Available at www.asef.org/index.php/about/history. 
states that “as an informal process, ASEM need 
not be institutionalised”.  
5. A short survey of ASEM working 
methods 
Since ASEM was established in 1996, nine 
working methods were adopted, including three 
‘non-papers’. 19  Though working methods, 
adopted either by ASEM leaders or FMMs, may 
seem like ASEM ‘administrative law’, that is 
‘ASEM laws’ implementing leaders’ instructions 
and wishes, it is perhaps necessary to point out 
that not applying these working methods is not 
‘illegal’, nor does it necessarily cause friction, 
since being informal is where ASEM’s 
uniqueness lies. The authors have surveyed how 
ASEM working methods have been 
implemented, in our search to answer our query 
of how, in the absence of an institution, ASEM 
works. We show that the four summits and the 
four FMMs since the 6th ASEM in Helsinki (held 
(10-11 September 2006) followed the instructions 
given at ASEM 6 and each time updated the 
clusters of political, economic and cultural 
topics according to the changes in the 
international arena. But it might still beg the 
question of what added value ASEM provides 
when ASEM leaders and foreign ministers 
express their support of issues such as UN 
reform, the WTO, the Middle East peace 
process, etc., which appear to be beyond 
ASEM’s mandate. To answer this question, 
referring to AECF 2000,20  one must remember 
that the nature of ASEM lies precisely in the 
evolving political dialogue process itself 
between Asia and Europe. Thus negotiating the 
text of the Chair Statement is an opinion-
forming process, laying down foundations for 
future discussions among ASEM partners.  
We also conclude that ASEM leaders’ wish to 
strengthen the role of coordinators has been 
duly pursued and implemented. So has the 
suggestion to enhance the role of summit hosts 
before and after a summit. This is achieved by 
                                                   
19 See Pelkmans & Hu (2014) for details. 
20  The Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework (AECF), 
adopted by Heads of State/Government at ASEM 3 in 
Seoul in 2000, sets out the vision, principles, objectives, 
priorities and mechanisms for the ASEM process for the 
first decade of the new millennium. 
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internal as well as external means, for example, 
“the ASEM coordinators’ meeting” mechanism 
and the technical coordination project.  
Nonetheless, some aspects of the ASEM 
working methods have been ignored. We 
provide evidence that issue-based leadership 
was never really taken seriously. 21  Another 
example consists in the quasi-permanent search 
for more effective and durable technical support 
of the splintered and extremely decentralised 
ASEM process. Several initiatives have been 
taken such as the AVS, discussions about a 
modest technical ASEM secretariat (which went 
nowhere), and several ad hoc and temporary 
technical support projects, such as TASC and the 
ACSG. There is evidence pointing to some 
degree of effectiveness of TASC but none (yet) 
for the ACSG. AVS failed. Enhanced 
coordination, as this problem is called, remains 
a weak spot in ASEM.  
Some ASEM working methods were applied 
partially. As is already mentioned in Section 3 
on ASEM follow-ups and regular meetings, our 
survey concludes that the SOM (Senior Officials 
Meetings) mechanism has been well established 
in the sectors of TFAP (trade facilitation action 
plan), culture, labour and employment, and 
migratory flows pursuant to what ASEM leaders 
recommended at the Helsinki Summit, but not 
in the sectors of environment, energy, health, 
science and technology and ICT. At the 
ministerial level, we found that meetings on 
culture, education, finance, labour and 
employment, and transport took place regularly. 
Reflecting on the sectoral SOMs, it seems that 
active cooperation in the areas of TFAP, customs 
and migratory flows remained at working level. 
They are not upgraded to the ministerial level. 
Conversely, in sectors without the preparation 
                                                   
21  The Helsinki Summit adopted the ‘issue-based 
leadership’ mechanism (IBL) in order to sustain a 
summit-to-summit momentum. Though initial attempts 
to implement IBL were serious, and progress, however 
limited, was made – with an IBL list adopted at the 
Beijing Summit – subsequent information on IBL cannot 
be found. The Collated List of Interested ASEM 
Members for Tangible Cooperation, annexed to the 
Chair Statement at FMM 11 (Delhi) appears strikingly 
similar to the IBL list adopted at the Beijing Summit. It 
is also possible to interpret IBL or the Delhi initiative as 
an attempt to introduce a kind of ‘variable geometry’ 
given the large number of ASEM countries. 
of SOMs, such as energy, environment, ICT and 
SMEs, meetings nevertheless took place at 
ministerial level. Indeed, more ministerials now 
take place than in Helsinki and all meet 
regularly (except the EMM as noted).  
The question of ASEM visibility, awareness and 
links with stakeholders is intrinsically difficult 
to handle, given that ASEM is typically intended 
for governments and driven by governments. 
Several attempts have been made to develop a 
‘better’ communication strategy and some 
elements have reached a wider public, such as 
the ASEM Infoboard, the EEAS ASEM website, 
and ASEF’s peoples-to-peoples activities and 
assistance for some ministerials.22  
We identified ASEM working methods for 
which we are unable to verify whether they 
were applied properly. These include the role of 
ASEM coordinators, the ‘regular’ contacts 
between embassies of ASEM countries and the 
roles of the three ASEM gatherings closely 
connected to the ASEM summits (AEBF, ASEP, 
and AEPF, explained below).  
The Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF) was 
envisaged by AECF 2000 as one of the key 
priorities for Asia-Europe cooperation. 23  It 
consists of a few working groups, but overall 
information about AEBF is very scarce, scant 
publicity exists between summits and no 
permanent information, let alone positions and 
background papers, can be traced. It is therefore 
not easy to verify how AEBF is fulfilling its 
mandate and what impact it has made on 
promoting business between the two regions. 
As for Asia-Europe People’s Forum (AEPF),24 
there is some doubt about its representativeness. 
AEPF seems to be more a gathering of (self-
selected) NGOs that shape an agenda that is 
rather selective and probably not representative 
of what many political currents or others in civil 
society would prefer to debate. 
Meanwhile, discussions conducted at the Asia-
Europe Parliamentary Partnership Meeting 
                                                   
22 See Pelkmans & Hu (2014) for details on ASEF. 
23  More information is available at 
www.aseminfoboard.org/asia-europe-business-forum-
aebf.html. See also Point IV.16, AECF 2000, for the 
AEBF’s mandate.  
24 www.aepf.info. 
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(ASEP)25 revolve around the same three pillars 
of cooperation as under the ASEM process. Very 
limited information is available as to how ASEP 
has supported greater public awareness of the 
ASEM process and particularly of the ASEM 
summit.   
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
on the working of ASEM 
6.1 Conclusions  
ASEM works surprisingly well in its own way 
and from the perspective of accepting what it is 
and what it is not. Its ‘dialogue’ function has 
deepened and intensified over the years. It has 
also broadened: ASEM works on an incredibly 
wide range of policy issues and does this at 
various levels, from the summit and foreign 
ministers meetings, to many other ministerials, 
high level groups, conferences, seminars and 
workshops. Generally, this broad mission is 
pursued whilst remaining faithful to ASEM’s 
character of informality, networking and 
flexibility. Although ASEM is purposefully not 
an agenda setter, it effectively ‘identifies’ issues 
of agreed policy relevance for the 50-plus 
countries concerned. 
Not only does ASEM work consistently on 
issues in all three ‘pillars’ (political, economic, 
and cultural/education/peoples-to-peoples), 
the combination of its flexibility and 
commitment to operate in all three pillars 
enables it to address topical priority issues 
following but also shaping the international 
policy agenda. This flexibility and informality 
allows regular discussions on sensitive 
questions such as human rights in an annual 
informal seminar setting. All three pillars 
witness a great deal of ASEM activity. There is 
no clear bias between pillars, all three have their 
peculiarities, but the second (economic) pillar 
has grown in its number of activities.  
It would seem that the many ASEM regular 
meetings strengthen the sustainability of and 
permanent (common) interest in ASEM. The 
‘regulars’ minimise the unpredictability of an 
ASEM summit-led tradition, express through 
                                                   
25  www.aseminfoboard.org/asia-europe-parliamentary-
partnership-meeting-asep.html. 
their permanence, at least implicitly, the ASEM 
common interest, and help in exploring better 
policies or best practices whilst contributing to a 
better mutual understanding of one another’s 
policies and positioning. The regularity should 
also help build trust between ministers and 
officials from Asia and Europe. The many 
‘regulars’ (30 in total, ministerials and other) 
reflect a degree of maturity in Asia-Europe 
relations. 
Amongst the many areas for ‘follow-up’ to 
summits, very few fail to be addressed. There is 
only one genuine and indeed conspicuous 
failure: the repeated calls, both in summit 
statements (three out of four) and FMMs, for 
ASEM economic ministers to meet. There are 
indications that many Asian countries would 
like the EMM to meet, whereas the EU 
apparently hesitates to do this at ministerial 
(and European Commission) level. At DG or 
technical level, however, many activities on 
trade, customs and investment continue as 
before. The EU’s reticence to engage in EMMs 
should be read in the light of the numerous 
trade (and investment) negotiations with Asian 
countries. Asian ASEM countries face ‘two EUs’, 
as it were: one is relevant to ASEM’s typical 
diplomacy (conducted by the EEAS, based on 
‘soft’ power and seeking what binds ASEM 
countries); the other to EU trade and investment 
policy (conducted by the Commission, based on 
‘hard’ disciplines and legal commitments of 
market access). Apparently, the preference is to 
enjoy a peaceful coexistence of these 
approaches, but not to blend them.  
The FMM is clearly fulfilling the role of 
‘guardian of ASEM’ in between summits. On the 
whole, FMMs conform very closely to the Chair 
Statement of the preceding summit.  
ASEM is very much a process driven by and 
serving governments. It is not, or is rather only 
indirectly, intended to serve or involve citizens, 
except sometimes in the margin (and in many 
ASEF activities targeted to citizens and the 
cultural sphere). This fundamental characteristic 
is a formidable hurdle to overcome in any 
communication strategy, because it translates 
into very little visibility and recognition of 
citizens; relevance to them is at best remote, if 
not absent, as no decisions are taken – it is all 
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about ‘dialogue’ and ‘follow-ups’ that concern 
only governments.  
The Helsinki Summit issued working methods 
instructions that subsequent summits and 
FMMs have followed. Each subsequent summit 
and meeting has also updated the political, 
economic and cultural topics under ASEM's 
purview, to keep in step with current affairs. 
The function of ASEM working methods is only 
to facilitate, i.e. without institutionalisation, 
operational measures or manifest added value. 
The nature of ASEM lies precisely in the 
evolving political dialogue process itself 
between Asia and Europe. Thus, negotiating the 
text of a Chair Statement is an opinion-forming 
process. Unfortunately, some aspects of the 
ASEM working methods have been ignored. We 
show that ‘issue-based leadership’ was never 
taken seriously. Another example consists in the 
quasi-permanent search for more effective and 
sustainable technical support of the splintered 
and extremely decentralised ASEM process. 
Enhanced coordination, as this problem is 
called, remains a weak spot in ASEM, though 
the degree of its weakness is contested. An 
ASEM secretariat has remained a controversial 
issue for the last 15 years. Some ASEM 
participants point out that, on the one hand, a 
technical secretariat would make neither an 
immediate nor significant impact, and, on the 
other hand, timely and well-prepared 
‘handovers’ of ASEM dossiers and its 
knowledge base within national administrations 
will sufficiently maintain ASEM ‘memory’ and 
spirit, ensuring continuity and stability. 
The ASEM policy with respect to the three 
ASEM gatherings closely connected to the 
ASEM summits (AEBF, ASEP, and AEPF) is less 
than clear and not explicit. There is some doubt 
about the representativeness of the AEPF, which 
seems to be more a gathering of (self-selected) 
NGOs. Also, one would expect the role of the 
AEBF to be more prominent. Scant publicity is 
generated until just before an ASEM summit 
and no permanent information, let alone 
positions and background papers, can be traced.   
Many previous attempts to improve efficiency 
and coordination have occurred since the 2000 
Seoul Summit: some have strayed or failed, 
whilst others now seem to work (e.g. host-to-
host summit cooperation). It should also be 
noted that it is not easy to identify other 
comparable international gatherings that 
involve many countries and consistently attract 
the highest level political leaders and from 
which ASEM could learn. Even the comparison 
of ASEM to the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (on security and 
transparency, as well as good practices in 
elections) and APEC prompts mixed reactions 
from the broad ASEM membership and opinion-
shapers; so, too, has the idea of inspecting how 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) works and what one 
might learn from it. Thus, one often hears, 
ASEM is therefore ‘unique’. Indeed, it is unique, 
but should this be regarded as a virtue or is its 
uniqueness an obstacle to its longer-run 
credibility and attractiveness?  
6.2 Policy recommendations 
I. For today’s ASEM, there is no need of 
reform.  
The core function of ASEM works. ASEM has 
proven to be an effective facilitator of Asia-
Europe dialogue in many ways, in many areas, 
and at all levels. For all the practical problems at 
the official level, which ASEM ‘coordination’ 
has apparently failed to resolve even after many 
attempts, it is nonetheless critical never to 
confuse this failure with the overall mission of 
ASEM: to maintain, develop and widen the 
scope of Asia-Europe dialogue and exchange 
between political leaders, supplemented by 
many other substantive encounters of a more 
specialised nature. As long as the nature of 
ASEM lies in the evolving dialogue process itself 
between Asia and Europe, there is no need to 
reform ASEM. 
II. Eliminating ASEM would inflict political 
and diplomatic costs. 
ASEM has lived up to its mission. ASEM 
summits remain useful forums for some 50 
political leaders from Asia and Europe to 
discuss relatively freely and keep channels open 
for exchange on many issues relevant to ASEM’s 
three pillars, including sensitive issues of ‘high 
politics’. Not having ASEM would have made 
such approaches more cumbersome, or in any 
case more fragmented, and possibly created 
lingering suspicions or perpetuated a lack of 
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mutual understanding. Preventing these 
problems, obstacles or inhibitions is precisely 
the paramount motive behind ASEM’s creation 
in 1995-96. Furthermore, ASEM has matured 
and its agenda is firmly established via a large 
number of ‘regular’ ASEM meetings, at 
ministerial and other levels, that complement 
ASEM summitry. Dismissing ASEM because it 
does not produce ‘results’ and ‘hence’ is a waste 
of time disregards the intangible but crucial 
benefits it bestows. Not having ASEM anymore 
would be costly.  
III. Tomorrow’s ASEM might be different. 
There are, however, good reasons for measured 
change. One reason consists of what is 
sometimes called the gap between expectations 
and capabilities, even though the former are 
hard to measure in a convincing way. If 
expectations in ASEM countries are structurally 
higher than what today’s ASEM can bring about 
given its nature, it might be worthwhile to 
reflect on ways to move from ‘dialogue’ to 
active ‘cooperation’, if only in some areas. 
Another reason is found in the drastic changes 
in the geopolitical and economic context since 
the mid-1990s, strongly suggesting that today’s 
predicament might well demand an adapted 
ASEM. A third reason might consist in the huge 
size of ASEM, combined with its UN-like 
principle of the equality of all ASEM countries. 
Whilst one ought to be extremely prudent before 
deviating from that principle, it cannot be 
ignored that China and India sit next to Malta 
and Luxembourg in ever more massive 
gatherings. Even if ‘issue-based leadership’ 
failed, forms of clustering countries and/or 
practising ‘variable geometry’ or perhaps 
focusing on certain themes would need to be 
considered, even more so when moves from 
‘dialogue to cooperation’ would be initiated.  
IV. 20th birthday gift: study on alternative 
ASEM designs 
Considering what ASEM’s characteristics have 
been over a period of no fewer than 18 years, 
one has to first accept that credible options for 
change are extremely limited. Improving its 
capability is possible, of course, but not without 
realising that many previous attempts to 
improve efficiency and coordination have been 
attempted since the 2000 Seoul Summit: some 
attempts have strayed or failed, whilst others 
now seem to work. Institutionalisation remains 
sensitive. One way this shows up is when one 
tries to compare ASEM to other international 
gatherings of many countries and attended 
consistently by the highest political leaders. 
Even comparison to the OSCE (on security and 
transparency, as well as good practices in 
elections) and APEC prompts mixed reactions 
from the broad ASEM membership and opinion-
shapers, let alone the idea of merely inspecting 
how the OECD works and what one might learn 
from it.  
Critical discussion about ASEM is in principle a 
sound form of engagement and ought to be 
encouraged in all ASEM quarters and countries. 
If the objective of a given assessment is to 
express the preference for going beyond mere 
exchanges of policy views and making ASEM 
more ‘effective’ in problem solving, realising 
that preference would lead to a very different 
ASEM. In other words, moving from dialogue to 
active cooperation – which is a familiar action in 
many other international organisations – does 
not seem to have many outspoken supporters 
amongst ASEM governments. This should not 
be read as an opinion that a major effort, e.g. by 
independent think tanks from Asia and Europe 
working together, to create a convincing 
rationale for redesigning ASEM would not be 
worth its while. It almost certainly would be. 
Both the deepened mutual trust and the more 
mature Asia-Europe relationship provide a 
foundation that was not in existence in the mid-
1990s. Also in terms of economic development 
and geopolitics, the context of Asia-Europe 
relations has drastically changed. The 20th 
anniversary of ASEM in 2016 seems to the 
authors to be an excellent occasion to organise in 
2015 a profound reflection on alternative 
designs of ASEM, stimulated first by 
independent thinkers.  
V. Getting more value out of ASEM: Exercise 
better ownership. 
The fundamental problem of ASEM might be its 
‘ownership’. ASEM is a large ‘collective’ and 
hence it risks suffering from typical ‘collective 
action’ problems. All governments ‘are’ ASEM, 
yet nobody seems to ‘own’ ASEM, with the 
remit or responsibilities that come with it. In a 
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way, it is admirable that ASEM works, despite 
its possibly fragile incentive structure. 
Therefore, one vital route to cement and 
ascertain ASEM’s viability is to reflect seriously 
on how to increase ‘ownership’ in ASEM. This is 
directly linked to ‘capability’. One could create 
better structures to obtain greater added value. 
The various sectorial SOMs might be 
transformed into or delegate tasks to ‘working 
parties’ or designated ASEM committees, with 
programme assignments. Chairs could rotate 
(always in Asia-Europe pairs, of course) every 
two or three years, work programmes and 
results could be pursued and published in 
ASEM publications and disseminated via the 
ASEM Infoboard, EEAS website and other 
means. Such working parties might commission 
studies and reports and even reach consensus 
regarding, e.g. best practices in certain policy 
areas, and disseminate all this information in an 
active way. The OECD and to a lesser extent 
APEC frequently create value-added activities 
and publications often in collaboration with 
governments. The central guiding principle is 
that such ASEM activities should benefit ASEM 
governments and indeed also a wider public. 
That is namely what ‘ownership’ implies: 
managing the precious common ‘asset’ of ASEM 
activities in ways that yield more and more 
tangible results. Getting more out of ASEM on a 
continuous basis, without in any way 
constraining ASEM governments, is an essential 
goal.  
VI. ASEM can usefully connect three mega-
FTAs. 
ASEM can play a cautious, constructive role in 
strategic discussions on world trade and 
investment. Precisely because it is neither 
necessary nor feasible to agree on operational 
conclusions to be laid down in legal 
commitments, Asia-Europe exchanges have the 
potential to gather broad support for selective 
WTO initiatives, be they multilateral or 
plurilateral. This could be generated from 
conferences, ‘ASEM studies’ and technical 
dialogues, and eventually reach the EMM. As 
there is no need to define a ‘mandate’ for such 
WTO activities, there are no tactical constraints 
for ASEM member countries or the EU as a 
group: it could be pure win-win. In addition, 
ASEM is uniquely well placed for bridging 
information gaps between ongoing mega-free-
trade agreement negotiations (RCEP, TPP and 
TTIP), given that ASEM membership overlaps 
partially with TPP, RCEP, TTIP and APEC. 
Following from such information exchanges, it 
would eventually be conceivable to engage in 
confidence-building measures between these 
three partially overlapping trade groupings in 
the making, on a voluntary basis. These could 
include principles of regulatory cooperation, as 
already discussed in OECD and APEC circles, as 
well as broad guidelines on standards at 
international level. The underlying idea is that 
the three mega-FTAs ‘reach out’ to third 
countries, in particular, in regulatory trade 
policy and investment issues, without 
constraining negotiators in detail.  
References 
Pelkmans, J. and W. Hu (2014), “Stocktaking 
and analysis of ASEM: Outcomes and impact, 
conclusions and policy recommendations”, 
Study commissioned by the EEAS and the 
European Commission (available for 
downloading on the EEAS website 
www.eeas.europa.eu). 
Pelkmans, J. and H. Shinkai (eds) (1997), ASEM, 
how promising a partnership?, European 
Institute of Asian Studies, Brussels. 
Pou Serradall, V. (1996), “The Asia-Europe 
meeting (ASEM), a historical turning point in 
relations between the two regions”, European 
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 2, pp. 185-210. 
Reiterer, M. (2002), Asia Europe, do they meet?, 
Asia-Europe Foundation, Singapore. 
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, Place du Congrès 1, B‐1000 Brussels, Belgium  
Tel: 32 (0)2 229 39 11 • Fax: 32 (0)2 219 41 51 • www.ceps.eu • VAT: BE 0424.123.986 
 
 
ABOUT CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is widely recognised as 
the most experienced and authoritative think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS 
acts as a leading forum for debate on EU affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research 
capacity, complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
• Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the challenges 
facing Europe today, 
• Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
• Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process, and 
• Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
• Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
• Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
• An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 
